Lesson 4: Property Rights and "Green" Incentives
| Economic Concepts | Environmental Context |
|---|---|
| Property rights shape incentives | Resource conservation: fisheries |
| Incentives | |
| Property Rights | |
| Tragedy of the Commons | |
National Content Standards Addressed:
Standard 4: People respond predictably to positive and negative incentives.
Standard 10: Institutions evolve in market economies to help individuals and groups accomplish their goals. Banks, labor unions, corporations, legal systems, and not-for-profit organizations are examples of important institutions. A different kind of institution, clearly defined and well enforced property rights, is essential to a market economy.
Key Points
- The underlying assumption with which economists approach social issues
is that all social phenomena emerge from the choices individuals
make in response to expected costs and benefits to themselves.
(Heyne)
- Review: Scarcity forces people to choose and to bear opportunity costs. (tie back to Bag game)
- Review: People choose, not organizations or countries or governments.
- Review: People's choices reflect their perceptions of the costs and benefits of the available alternatives.
- Incentives affect people's choices about the environment.
- Incentives are the anticipated rewards or punishments, monetary and non-monetary, that influence individual choices.
- Note the word anticipated. We never know exactly what the
costs and benefits are going to be; economics recognizes that people
choose in light of an unknown future.
- Illustrations: For example, the invention of the automobile - growth, convenience, and environmental impact
- Inference: Changes in incentives result in predictable changes in human behavior.
- Inference: If we want to change human behavior, we must change the
incentives.
Activity: "All the Fish in the Sea"
- The Tragedy of the Commons - Property held in common tends to be overused
because each user gains the full benefit of use while the costs of his
use are shared by all other owners.
- Common ownership rewards aggressive harvesting and premature use of the resource.
- Common ownership promotes conflict among community members with differing values.
- Common ownership penalizes stewardship and resource conservation.
- Common ownership works well to preserve resources only when no one wants to use them.
- Case: Fisheries depletion
- Case: 19th century buffalo slaughter / 20th century buffalo destruction of Yellowstone Nat'l Park
- The incentives associated with private property rights can help conserve
scarce resources:
- Private ownership entails penalties for premature harvesting or over-harvesting of resources.
- Private ownership rewards community and individual cooperation.
- Private ownership rewards conservation and stewardship behavior.
- Case: ITQs as a tool for fisheries conservation and restoration
- Case: Nature Conservancy
- To act as effective incentives for resource stewardship, private property
rights must be defined, defendable, and divestible.
- Definition: The privileges and limitations of property ownership must be clearly specified and easily ascertained.
- Defendable: Owners must have the reasonable expectation that their
property rights will be protected and/or that those who violate property
rights will be punished.
- This may be through the owner's own power or through social/governmental institutions like police and courts.
- Divestible: Owners may freely transfer all or parts of their property rights to others.
- Law and other social institutions affect the incentives for environmentally-friendly
behavior by property rights holders.
- Policy consequences lie in the future and sometimes well-intentioned
actions produce results that are not environmentally-friendly.
- Endangered Species Act (See Lesson 5)
- Policy consequences lie in the future and sometimes well-intentioned
actions produce results that are not environmentally-friendly.
Suggested Reading:
Community Run Fisheries - Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons, by
Donald R. Leal (PERC Policy Series PS-7, September, 1996) http://www.perc.org/publications/policyseries/community_full.php
Homesteading the Oceans - The Case for Property Rights in U.S. Fisheries,
by Donald R. Leal (PERC Policy Series PS-19, January 2001)
http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps19.pdf
Suggested Additional Classroom Activities:
Eco-Detectives - Lesson 2: "Why Do Free Goods Disappear So Quickly?"
pp. 19 -26.
Eco Detectives - Lesson 3: "Why Do We Have So Few Whales and
So Many
Chickens?" pp. 27-38.